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Abstract. This paper addresses two emerging challenges that multimedia distri-
buted systems have to deal with: the user’s constant mobility and the informa-
tion’s sensitivity. The systems have to adapt, in real time, to the user’s context 
and situation in order to provide him with relevant results without breaking the 
security and privacy policies. Distributed multimedia systems, such as the one 
proposed by the LINDO project, do not generally consider both issues. In this 
paper, we apply an access control layer on top of the LINDO architecture that 
takes into consideration the user’s context and situation and recommends alterna-
tive resources to the user when he is facing an important situation. The proposed 
solution was implemented and tested in a video surveillance use case. 
1 Introduction 
With the proliferation of multimedia data and applications in a distributed and dynam-
ic environment, many solutions for indexing and accessing multimedia collections are 
proposed to cope with emerging challenges like: distributed storage and decentralized 
processing, choice of the indexing algorithms, real time and location-aware informa-
tion retrieval, optimization of resources consumption (e.g., CPU, RAM, storage, net-
work communications). 
In the multimedia contents’ management another important issue is raised by the 
user’s mobility and the fact that he/she wants and needs to access the contents from 
anywhere at any moment: the system’s and contents’ security. This issue concerns 
five criteria: 
• Confidentiality: assurance that the information is shared only among autho-
rized persons or organization;
• Privacy: assurance that the identifiable data relating to a person is protected
during the information exchange/sharing;
• Integrity: assurance that information is authentic and complete;
• Availability: assurance that the information is accessible when needed, by
those who need it;
• Traceability: ability to verify the history, location, or application of an item.
In this highly dynamic context, the multimedia database systems security becomes 
a critical issue. Many application domains (e.g., medical, military, video surveillance) 
may contain sensitive information which should not be or could only partially be ac-
cessed by general users. Therefore, it is essential to support security management of 
multimedia systems and design security models accordingly.  
On top of that, we have to consider also that the users are more and more mobile 
and they need to access the system from anywhere, in real time. There are some cases 
when the user’s context and situation are important, and in order to accomplish a cer-
tain task the user must have access to the information. A definition of system security 
is provided by [1]: “a computing system is secure, if and only if it satisfies the in-
tended purposes without violating relevant informational (or other) rights”. Thus, a 
solution to this privacy and security problem has to be found in order to provide the 
user with some contents without breaking the system’s security.  
In this paper, we present a new access control layer on top of the distributed archi-
tecture proposed by the LINDO project1, which considers the user’s context and situa-
tion within the privacy and security management process. The project’s objective was 
to build a distributed system for multimedia content management, and to ensure effec-
tive indexing and storage of data acquired in real time, while considering the resource 
consumption optimization. The project did not address the issues linked to data priva-
cy and security. The users have full access to all contents after an authentication.  
Our objective is to include, within the LINDO framework, the access control in or-
der to attain a pervasive accessibility that enables the user to access multimedia con-
tents at anytime, from anywhere, without breaking the system’s security.  
In the next section we introduce a state of the art covering distributed access con-
trol management, and multimedia access control. The LINDO approach is described 
in section 3. In section 4, we apply an access control layer on top of the LINDO archi-
tecture. In section 5, the adaptive access control solution is illustrated through a video 
surveillance use case. Finally, conclusions and future work directions are provided in 
section 6. 
2 Related Work 
In order to deal with the challenges raised by the big multimedia collections, more 
and more systems use a distributed architecture for their management. An advantage 
of this kind of systems is that they benefit from the distributed storage and processing 
of the contents and the obtained metadata, and thus, a better performance. However, a 
major problem that these systems encounter is the heterogeneity of indexing algo-
rithms and of the generated metadata and the control of user’s access to the system. 
In some of the studied systems, complete access is granted after successful authen-
tication of the user. In most application domains a more sophisticated and complex 
access control is required. In the next section we detail different strategies for distri-
buted access control.  
1 http://lindo-itea.eu/
2.1 Distributed Access Control  
In order to guarantee full protection of the confidential information within a decent
lized system, accessibility should be controlled through all the communicati
channels: the application level, the middleware level, the operating system level a
finally through the network.  
Many models were defined over the years to address the access control issue, wi
out necessarily considering the contents distribution and the user’s mobility: DAC [
MAC [3], RBAC [4], and XACML [5].  
In pervasive systems, an important issue that has to be taken into account in t
access control management is the user’s context and situation in the moment wh
he/she is accessing the system. More precisely, the system has to react, in real time,
the constant change in the user’s context and situation, in order to provide an adapti
access according to the user’s needs.  
2.2 Context-Aware Access Control  
In ubiquitous computing environments, users are mobile and typically accessi
resources using mobile devices. As a result, the user’s context (e.g., time, locatio
network connection, device) becomes highly dynamic, and thus, granting him acce
to the contents without taking his current context into account can compromise t
system’s security as the user’s access privileges do not only depend on “Who the u
is”, but also on “Where the user is” and “What is the user’s state and the state of t
user’s environment”. Thus, access control in ubiquitous applications requires that t
user’s privileges dynamically change based on his context and role. Thus, permissio
assignment for a user has become more complex and dependent on his context.  
Many research works have proposed to extend the RBAC model in order to ta
into account the context’s evolution:  
• Temporal RBAC [6] considers time as a constraint for the activation a
deactivation of a role.
• Spatial RBAC [7] incorporates location information associated with roles
order to permit location-based security policies. Permissions are dynamica
assigned to the role dependent on location.
• Dynamic Role Based Access Control [8] dynamically adjusts role and p
mission assignments based on context information.
• UbiquiTous Role-Based Access Control [9] considers the time and the loc
tion of the user as important elements for the activation and disabling o
role. Each role has a state which is changeable during a session.
• [10] provides a context-aware RBAC model that separates context manag
ment from the access control model in order to facilitate decision-making
cases where an authorization decision is connected to several contextual co
straints.
All these models tie permission assignment to the user’s identity and role but also
his contextual attributes, but they are not flexible and responsive enough to deal w
any type of situation confronting the user (emergency, un-expected event, etc.).  ra-
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2.3 Situation-Aware Access Control 
The need of situation-awareness in access control was first expressed by [11], who 
highlighted the importance of providing a security scheme that would relax access 
rules in order to enable users to meet exceptional circumstances (disasters, medical 
emergencies or time-critical events).  
The works of [12] have also highlighted the importance of providing a flexible se-
curity system that would offer more than yes or no answers and that would not rely on 
predefined solutions in meeting unanticipated access demands.  
A flexible solution, called “Break-Glass”, was adopted as a standard within health 
care systems [13]. The solution helps users to confront emergent situations by grant-
ing them access to unauthorized needed resources. Despite all the protective steps 
accompanying it, the “Break-Glass” is an extreme solution that enables users to 
perform illegitimate intrusions and unjustified access attempts. Therefore, various 
research works have focused on either controlling the usage of “Break-Glass” by 
improving its modeling and on facilitating it’s integration within the conventional 
access control models in order to confront the privacy and integrity threats or on pro-
posing other less risky situation-aware access control solutions: [14], [15].  
The flexibility level offered by these access control models is directly proportional 
to the risk of violating the system’s security. The more the access control flexibility 
is performed on a rule-based, predefined or assisted manner, the less the violation 
risks are introduced. The more the flexibility is provided in an automatic and ad hoc 
manner, the more the risk level is elevated.  
When applying these access control models to the multimedia domain, the things 
become more complex, especially if a fine-grain access control is needed.  
2.4 Multimedia Access Control  
Many solutions have been proposed in order to secure the access to multimedia data-
bases and systems. While some authors were interested in the security of the connec-
tion to the systems and of the distribution of the contents [16], others were focused on 
the content-based multimedia access control with fine-grain restrictions at a specific 
level of the multimedia data [17].  
[18] proposes a framework that addresses multi-level multimedia access control by 
adopting RBAC, XML and Object-Relational Databases. The authors associated roles 
to users, IP addresses, objects and time periods. All multimedia contents handled by 
their system have to be segmented. Only the objects which have roles associated to 
are extracted from the multimedia contents.  
[19] studied the confidentiality and privacy issues in the context of a video surveil-
lance system. They defined access rights to different hierarchical objects that can be 
extracted from the video contents. They focused on the detection of suspicious events. 
The management of access control in pervasive environments has evolved over the 
last years and it takes into account the user’s context in the moment when he is inte-
racting with the system. Meanwhile, the distributed multimedia systems do not con-
centrate their effort on these issues, they consider the management of the contents and 
their indexing, without the intention of providing solutions for the optimization of the 
resource consumption.  
In order to offer a better
tween the resource consum
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could be some servers that contain relevant information that has not been indexed 
with the right algorithms. For this reason, supplementary algorithms are selected and 
executed on a sub-collection of multimedia contents. All the results obtained from the 
remote servers are sent to the central server, where they are combined and displayed 
to the user.  
In this system, the user has full access to all the functionalities and resources after 
an authentification process. The pervasive access to the system emphasizes the access 
control and security issues, because of multimedia contents sensitivity and privacy 
protection laws that impose anonymity constraints. These issues were not treated in 
the LINDO project.  
4 Adding an Access Control Layer to the LINDO Architecture  
When applying one of the solutions presented in section 2 to the LINDO system, the 
lack of results returned to a user’s query might not only be due to the lack of results 
existing within the system but also due to access restrictions imposed by the security 
layer. This lack of results could be a problem for the user, and prevent him from rea-
lizing his task. In order to surpass this limitation, we propose to add an access layer 
that customizes user’s access and is responsible for managing:  
The access rights granted to users or services demanding access to multimedia con-
tents that vary according to their role, their context and their situation. 
The access rights for executing queries that employ the explicit indexing algo-
rithms: the risk of disclosing personal or confidential information arises with the level 
of detail sought and provided by the indexing algorithm. For that we have introduced 
two “checking points” (illustrated in Figure 1, before executing explicit indexing 
algorithms and before displaying the results) where the user’s access rights in his 
given situation are verified. 
In order to achieve these goals, we employ PSQRS (Pervasive Situation-aware 
Query Rewriting System), an adaptive decision-making system that confronts access 
denials taking place in real-time situations by rewriting access requests in order to 
offer alternative-based access solutions, presented in section 4.2. This approach is 
based on the RBAC model and the XACML standard, and it exploits the user’s con-
text (e.g., location, time) and his situation (i.e., the emergency level of the task the 
user is solving when accessing the system).  
The access control relaxation that we propose to carry out respects the access rights 
defined to protect the multimedia content and applies the adaptive decision-making at 
two functionalities:  
• The explicit indexation execution and the indexing algorithms selection.
• The multimedia contents filtering and presentation.
More precisely, in the two red points illustrated in Figure 1, a matching function is 
executed, in order to establish based on user’s profile and situation if he has the right 
to run explicit algorithms, respectively to access the content:  
?.:(Up, Situation, Policy) -> Permit/Deny, 
where Up is the user’s profile, the Situation is a level of emergency (explicitly pro-
vided by the user, or inferred from his location, context and other explicit information 
provided by the user) and Policy is the set of rules that define the security policy of 
the system.  
Fig. 2. The PSQRS Architecture 
The user profile is defined as: 
Up = < Uid;Name;Login;Password;RoleId > 
where Uid is the user’s id, Name is the user’s name, Login is the user’s login, 
Password is the user’s password and RoleId represents the role that is associated to 
this user for the current access to the system.  
An access rule is defined as: 
Rule = < RuleId;RoleId;Action;Context;Permission > 
A rule defines a certain Permission (Permit or Deny) for a certain role (i.e, RoleID) 
and Action (e.g., explicit indexing, object visualization) in a certain Context.  
Next, we introduce the detailed functionality of the PSQRS architecture. 
4.1 The PSQRS Architecture  
As illustrated in Figure 2, the PSQRS architecture contains several components and 
the sequence of its functionality starts from the user, who enters the system through 
an authentication portal (step 1) and launches an access request to a certain element 
(step 2). This request will be interpreted by our Query Interpreter that will translate 
the request into an XACML request and send it to the Query Analyzer (step3). The 
request (R) will be analyzed in consideration with the user’s profile – automatically 
extracted at the sign in process -and according to his context. As the analysis finishes, 
  
the Query Analyzer would send the result directly to the user if it’s a Permit (step 4a) 
or back to the Query Interpreter, if it’s a deny (step 4b).  
In a deny situation the adaptive situation-aware query rewriting mechanism will 
take place as follows: the Query Interpreter will check the sensitivity of the situation 
with the help of the Sensitivity Analyzer (steps 5, 6) and according to the situation’s 
importance level, the Query Interpreter will search for similar or alternative resources 
through the Similarity Provider (steps 7, 8) and employ them to rewrite the XACML 
request (R’) and send it again to the Query Analyzer that will analyze the request and 
transfer the result back to the user (steps 10a,10b).  
4.2 The Fusion of PSQRS and LINDO System  
In order to include this access control layer to the LINDO system, some changes have 
to be done into the system. More precisely, from a functional point of view, each time 
an access to the system is demanded (the red circles in Figure 1), the PSQRS system 
is used before applying the explicit indexation and before displaying the results. From 
an architectural point of view, the system’s architecture, detailed in [1], was enhanced 
with several modules and functionalities.  
Thus, in Figure 3, the modules that were added or modified are displayed in red. 
Almost all the changes are encountered on the central server:  
• the Authentification Module was added. This module determines if the user
is known by the system and retrieves his profile based on his context. Each
user request passes through this module, thus if between two requests the us-
er’s context changes his profile could change also.
• the Access Control Module was added. In this module were included the
Query Interpreter, the Sensitivity Analyzer and the Similarity provider. All
information that is sent to the user passes through this module in order to ap-
ply a possible access control adaptation.
• the Terminal Interface was modified in order to capture the user’s context
and situation.
• a database with RBAC roles, rules and users’ profiles was included into the
Metadata Engine. It contains also information on the access adaptation.
• the Query Analyzer was integrated into the Request Processor.
• on the Remote Server, only the Access Manager was modified. In fact, a
new functionality was added to this module: the execution of an indexing
algorithm.
For each identified RBAC role, access rights to the multimedia contents, the expli-
cit indexing and the execution of certain indexing algorithms are specified according 
to the context the user can have when accessing the system. The user’s situation is 
captured by the system in an implicit (by analyzing the context) or explicit way (in the 
user interface). In order to offer alternatives to the user according to his situation, the 
Similarity Provider can select other multimedia contents or execute some algorithms 
that extract information from the content or modify it in order to respect the user’s 
access rights.  
Fig. 3. The modified LIN
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5 The Video Surveillance Use Case  
This use case concerns a public transportation company that placed surveillance cam-
eras in buses and metros, around the stations and ticket machines.  
This system is used by the security agents and police officers. Thus we can identify 
two roles: security agent and policeman. The access to the system can be done from 
the control room, or from the stations using a mobile phone. For each role a set of 
restrictions can be established, based on the existing laws and on the tasks that they 
have to deal with. Table 1 provides some examples of the access rights given to each 
role, in a certain context and for a certain multimedia content. For example, a security 
agent does not have the right to see passenger’s faces nor to execute the explicit in-
dexation when he is not in the control room, and he wants to access the multimedia 
content acquired by the video cameras located in buses.  
In this use case we can identify several situations: the security agent investigates 
on a lost object incident, a lost child research, a bomb attach. Each one of these situa-
tions has attached a level of importance (Level=0 is a normal situation, Level=5 is the 
most important situation).  
Let us consider the following scenario: Taking the bus 2 from “Trocadero” station 
to “Place d’Italie” station at 14:15, Helen has forgotten her red bag in the bus. As 
soon as she realized, she went out to report the problem at the information counter in 
a metro station.  
A typical treatment of such situations goes through the customer service agent who 
opens a lost object incident with the identification number 1234, takes the descrip-
tions and transmits them to the security agent on site. The security agent will follow 
different steps in order to find the object. He will check if the object has already been 
found or returned to the lost and found office by someone. Otherwise, he will execute 
a query on from his mobile device to check if the object is still in the same location or 
if somebody took it.  
Fig. 4. LINDO user interface 
The agent will formulate the following query, in the terminal interface presented in 
Figure 4 : Find all videos containing a red bag, forgotten in bus nr 2 at Place d’Italie, 
Paris station, on the 1st of December, between 2:00pm and now (3:00pm), related to 
the incident number 1234.  
In the next sub-sections we present the application of two strategies for ensuring 
the access control: taking in to account only the user’s context, and considering also 
his situation.  
5.1 Applying a Context Access-Control Strategy  
The query is processed and translated into XQuery. This query transformation is de-
tailed in [20].  
The query processing begins by locating the servers responsible for managing the 
data captured by the cameras located in the bus nr 2, which passed between 14h00 
and 15h00 at Place d’Italie station. Next, a filtering step is performed to restrict the 
search within the segments captured between 14:00 and 15:00.  
The system will then, determine a list of indexing algorithms that would meet the 
needs and context expressed within the query. Supposing that all the selected algo-
rithms were executed during the implicit indexation process, the query will be ex-
ecuted and thus the video segments that contain red objects are retrieved.  
A filtering process is applied to take into account access control rules. Analyzing 
the access rights assigned to the security agent, we find that he is not authorized to 
access the videos containing passenger’s faces when he is not in the control room. 
Therefore, considering these access restrictions, the system will eliminate the seg-
ments that contain person faces and finally return to the user the list of segments that 
contain a red object (if available).  
5.2 Applying a Situation Access-Control Strategy  
The search results returned to the security agent in this case might be insufficient. The 
red bag might be present in the unauthorized segments containing passenger faces.  
An adaptive solution can be employed when the system identifies access chal-
lenges related to the user’s context or at an important situation. In this scenario, the 
“lost object” situation is explicitly provided by the agent through the incident number. 
The implementation of the adaptive solutions is performed by the PSQRS that 
adapts decision-making by rewriting the XACML queries.  
As shown in Table 2, the richness of the elements that we can embed within an 
XACML query enables it to describe the contextual attributes characterizing:  
• the requested content in the “resource” tag, in red in the figure,
• the user launching the request in the “subject” tag, in bold in the figure
• the situation at which the user has launched the access request in the “environ-
ment” tag, in blue in the figure.
The importance level of the situation will determine the level of adaptation.
  
As the adaptive querying mode is triggered, the query processing mechanism will 
change to ensure the success of the search by providing a variety of adaptive solutions 
in correspondence with the situation’s sensitivity level.  
The adaptation process in this scenario will follow another scheme since the lost 
object situation is judged to be of higher importance (Level=1). Hence, the Similarity 
Provider component will be replaced by an Adaptive Solutions Provider. This com-
ponent will provide some predefined solutions that could bypass the access control 
challenge or would assist the user in adapting and reformulating his query by pointing 
out the access challenge and offering him adaptive solutions that would suit his con-
text, the solutions are often saved in a predefined database. Table 3 shows examples 
of the solutions that the system can offer.  
Table 2. XACML request embedding the user’s query 
<Request> 
 <Subject> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:subject-id"> 
 <AttributeValue>John Smith</AttributeValue> </Attribute> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role"> 
 <AttributeValue>Security Agent</AttributeValue> </Attribute> 
 <AttributeAttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:securityAgent-id"> 
    <AttributeValue>sa2023</AttributeValue></Attribute> 
 </Subject>    
 <Resource>  
 <ResourceContent> 
            <UserQuery>   <QueryInText> Find all videos containing a red bag, forgotten in 
bus nr 2 at Place d’Italie station, Paris, on the 1st of December, between 2:00pm and now 
(3:00pm)</QueryInText> 
                <MediaLocation> bus nr 2 at Place d’Italie station, Paris </MediaLocation> 
                <MediaFormat>Video</MediaFormat> 
                    <TimeSpan>  
                        <From>2012-12-01T14:00:00</From>  
                        <To> 2012-12-01T15:00:00</To> 
                    </TimeSpan>   </UserQuery>    
 </ResourceContent> 
 </Resource> 
 <Action> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:action:action-id"> 
 <AttributeValue>Read</AttributeValue> </Attribute> 
 </Action> 
 <Environment> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:environment:environment-id"> 
 <AttributeValue>Situation</AttributeValue> </Attribute> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:environment:situation-id"> 
 <AttributeValue>Forgotten Object</AttributeValue> </Attribute> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:environment:sitLevel-id"> 
 <AttributeValue>1</AttributeValue> 
 </Attribute> 
   </Environment> 
</Request> 
New solutions can also be inserted to the adaptive solutions database through a 
learning mechanism that detects the solutions that users employ when encountered 
with access challenges in real time.  
 The success of the adaptive solutions suggested by the users would eventually be 
more efficient if they knew the reason behind the access denial. The error messages 
that often accompany the returned access denial results can serve as indicators to help 
the users in finding alternative solutions.  
Therefore, the adaptive solution for this example will modify the treatment process 
and will: neglect the filtering step responsible for imposing the access control con-
straints and replace it with an adaptive step-related to the presentation of resources 
with unauthorized content.  
Table 3. The solutions that our adaptive query processing module can use 
Problem The adaptive solution 
The privacy law imposing the protection of anonymity of audiovisual contents. 
Passenger faces are not authorized Display the content after the execution of an algorithm that applies a blur face function. 
Voices are not-authorized Use an algorithm for speech-to-text transcription. 
Video volume 
Lack of storage capacity on the user’s 
machine 
Use a compression algorithm in order to obtain a smaller 
file. 
Format not supported by the user’s 
machine Use a conversion algorithm into a compatible format 
Download problems due to a low 
bandwidth 
Use a summarization algorithm in order to obtain a 
concise version of the content. 
By applying this process to the scenario described above, the system will return the 
video segments taken from the Trocadero station between 14:00 and 15:00 and con-
taining a red object. These results will be filtered in order to detect the unauthorized 
segments (containing passenger faces). This is where the system will apply the adap-
tation process that would filter the display to conform with the access restrictions 
imposed by the system.  
The adaptation will be performed through a face detection step and the use of an 
algorithm that applies a “blur function” to protect the privacy of passengers appearing 
in these segments in order to return to the user a list of relevant results that respect the 
access rules.  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented an adaptive approach for access control management 
within multimedia distributed systems, by considering the user’s context and situa-
tion. Our solution overcomes the access denials that take place in real time access 
demands by modifying the query processing mechanism and by providing adaptive 
solutions to bypass the access control constraints. The proposed solution has been 
validated within the LINDO framework in the context of a video surveillance use 
case. We applied and validated the same access control approach for other use cases, 
such as Health care Systems [21].  
The adaptive and alternative based situation-aware solution can increase the 
complexity of processing the request, but if we consider the usefulness of the results 
  
provided in real time and the fact they do not violate the access rights defined by the 
privacy law, this complexity seems quite acceptable.  
In future works, we aim to extend our proposal by taking into account different 
contextual elements that might also influence the accessibility to multimedia content 
(e.g., hardware, network bandwidth, etc.) and to apply the adaptive process not only at 
the presentation level but also at the choice of the explicit indexing algorithms that are 
protected by RBAC constraints. We plan to exploit users profiles and behavior in 
order to automatically determine the alternative solutions to use in case when even the 
PSQRS system returns an access denial. If users do not obtain the desired results, they 
find other ways to reach their goal. Learning from the experience and the work of 
others will provide new and interesting adaptive solutions.  
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